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Abstract
We propose Weibull delegate racing (WDR) to explicitly model surviving under
competing events and to interpret how the covariates accelerate or decelerate the
event time. It explains non-monotonic covariate effects by racing a potentially in-
finite number of sub-events, and consequently relaxes the ubiquitous proportional-
hazards assumption which may be too restrictive. For inference, we develop a
Gibbs-sampler-based MCMC algorithm along with maximum a posteriori estima-
tions for big data applications. We analyze time to loan payoff and default on
Prosper.com, demonstrating not only a distinguished performance of WDR, but
also the value of standard and soft information.
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1 Introduction
The risk-return tradeoff is always an important concern to investors in financial markets.
The tradeoff takes into account not only borrowers’ creditworthiness that determines
the risk of loan default, but also the time to default since a prolonged repayment of
principal and interest can reduce, compensate for or even exceed the loss from default
[Banasik et al., 1999]. Meanwhile, time to early payoff has analogous influence on return
of investment (ROI). For example, if a loan is fully repaid in a lump sum at an early stage,
the ROI will be remarkably lower than expected. One may argue that the annualized rate
of return will be unchanged if the loan is paid off early and the money repaid continues
to be invested. Actually, this is not true in practice due to the existence of transaction
costs, such as the transaction fees and the time that investors spend in searching equally
profitable bonds. Time to loan payoff and time to default hereby play a crucial role in
classifying a loan into an appropriate level of risk and reward and should be an essential
consideration in investment decisions.
Ideally, investors maximize returns by investing in loans where borrowers have a
long time to complete repayment or to default. However, it can be hard to screen such
borrowers by qualitatively examining a small amount of standard information because a
borrower’s characteristic that can reduce the chance of default or postpone the default
time often contributes to early payoff. For example, a borrower with a high credit grade
and high income is less likely to default but more likely to pay off the loan early to avoid
the interest. Consequently, the effect of credit grades and income levels on ROI may be
ambiguous without quantitative analysis. Such ambiguity gives prominence to the joint
analysis of time to both endpoints. Survival analysis, or time-to-event modeling, provides
a powerful tool to analyze how borrower’s characteristics influence the time to payoff and
time to default and thus ROI.
In survival analysis that explores the relationship between features and time to events,
existing methods often parameterize the hazard function with a weighted linear combina-
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tion of the features. One of the most popular methods is the proportional hazards models,
like Cox model [Cox, 1992] which is semi-parametric in that it assumes a non-parametric
baseline hazard multiplied by a covariate-dependent coefficient. The proportional hazards
models are often applied to population-level studies that try to unveil the relationship
between the risk factors and hazard functions, such as to what degree a unit increase in
a covariate is multiplicative to the hazard rate. However, it may have several drawbacks
when we care about interpreting the feature effects as well as predicting the event time.
First, the feature effect is interpreted as the log of a multiplier of the nonparametric base-
line hazard which is estimated separately, but the effect on the event time is often not
evident and the time prediction requires further modeling. Second, the interpretability is
obtained by sacrificing model flexibility, because the proportional-hazards assumption is
violated when the covariate effects are non-monotonic. For example, both very high and
very low ambient temperatures were related to high mortality rates in Valencia, Spain,
1991-1993 [Ballester et al., 1997], and a significantly increased mortality rate is associated
with both underweight and obesity [Flegal et al., 2007]. Another source of nonlinearity
is from interaction effects. For example, an increased interest rate may accelerate the
time to default for borrowers with low income and a low credit grade, but such accelera-
tion may be less remarkable or insignificant for borrowers of very high credit-worthiness.
Data transformations like adding square and interaction terms can alleviate this problem
but often requires expert opinions. Moreover, complex data transformations like using
kernels or neural networks would undermine the model interpretability. Third, the pro-
portional hazards models rank all subjects by their event time and are incapable of big
data analysis as the rankings of subjects always change when a random mini-batch sample
is drawn so that an unbiased gradient is hard to find and thus a stochastic-gradient-based
optimization is not applicable.
It is very common in survival analysis to consider competing events (also known as
competing risks) which are mutually exclusive, i.e., the occurrence of one event precludes
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other events. Apart from modeling the time, in the presence of competing events, it is also
important to model the event type, or which one of the events is likely to occur first. Two
of the most classical models are the Cox model with competing risks [Wolbers et al., 2014,
Austin et al., 2016] and the Fine-Gray (FG) subdistribution model [Fine and Gray, 1999]
which model cause-specific and subdistribution hazard functions [Putter et al., 2007, Lau
et al., 2009], respectively, with the proportional-hazards assumption. The former is often
applied to studying the etiology of diseases, while the latter is favorable when developing
prediction models and risk-censoring systems [Austin et al., 2016].
Loan payoff and default are two competing events and the time to both events needs
to be jointly modeled. Compared to early payoff, more research has studied the default
probability and default time alone. Divino et al. [2013] use the Cox proportional hazards
model and time-varying covariates to study how the loan-specific and economy’s basic
interest rates affect the default probability in Brazil. Durovic [2017] stratifies data by
loan terms and purposes, and use Kaplan-Meier estimate of survival function within the
vintage framework to study the default probability of online loans on LendingClub.com.
Miller [2012] explores risk factors of online loan default on Prosper.com using quantile
regression of default time. Regarding loan default and early payoff as competing events,
Stepanova and Thomas [2002] study a personal loan data set from a UK financial insti-
tution. They propose a way of coarse-classifying of features by survival analysis of early
payoff and default using two separate Cox models. Concretely, when analyzing the time
to default they treat the borrowers who have repaid the loan as censored observations,
and analogously when analyzing the time to payoff they treat as censored the borrowers
who have defaulted. Baesens et al. [2005] also analyze time to loan early payoff and
default, compare Cox models and neural networks and have found their performances
are comparable. Apart from Cox models’ lack of modeling flexibility and neural net-
works’ lack of interpretability, they also analyze default (payoff) separately by treating
borrowers who have paid off the loan (default) as censored.
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Although we can enable every survival model that can handle censoring to model
competing events if we separately analyze one competing event at a time and regard ob-
servations having other events as censored, this trick of censoring is problematic because
it violates the assumption of independent or noninformative censoring [Kalbfleisch and
Prentice, 2011]. This assumption requires subjects who are exposed to the risk to have
the same future risk for the occurrence of the event as the censored ones do, as if censor-
ing is random and thus noninformative. The assumption often holds in the single-event
analysis where censoring is due to random missing or lost to follow-up, but it is unrea-
sonable to assume that borrowers who have paid off the loans can represent those who
may default, or the other way around. As a result, violating this assumption may lead
to over-estimation of the cumulative incidence [Austin et al., 2016, Tong et al., 2012]. A
possible remedy is to adjust the cumulative incidence through the Kaplan-Meier estimate
[Tong et al., 2012], which, however, may be inaccurate because the Kaplan-Meier esti-
mate is for the whole population without considering individual feature effects. A better
solution is to turn to models that are specifically designed for joint analysis of multiple
competing events, such as the FG subdistribution hazard model. It is good at predicting
individuals’ risks [Lau et al., 2009], but its linear proportional-hazards assumption may
narrow its scope of application.
The existence of non-monotonic covariate effects can easily challenge and break the
proportional-hazards assumption as in the FG model. This barrier has been surmounted
by nonparametric approaches, such as random survival forests [Ishwaran et al., 2014],
Gaussian processes [Barrett and Coolen, 2013] and neural networks that discretize the
survival time [Lee et al., 2018]. These approaches are specifically designed for the exis-
tence of competing events and used for studies at an individual level, such as predicting
the survival time, but almost unable to tell which or how covariates influence the event-
specific hazard or survival time. So these models may be not of interest when we aim to
explain the feature effects on loan default and early payoff.
5
To this end, we need a model for survival analysis of competing events that achieves
a good balance of model interpretability and flexibility and obeys the noninformative
censoring assumption as well. So we construct Weibull delegate racing (WDR) survival
model, a gamma-process-based nonparametric Bayesian hierarchical model for competing
events. WDR utilizes the race among Weibull random variables to jointly model all the
competing events, enables the nonlinear modeling capability which is determined data-
adaptively, and has an interpretation as a race among latent sub-events. In addition,
WDR is an accelerated failure time model where the features accelerate or decelerate
the progression of time to each respective competing event, so that it is more appealing
compared to proportional hazards models when feature effects on payoff time or default
time are of interest.
We test our WDR model using data from Prosper.com, one of the largest debt-based
crowdfunding or peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms in the U.S. We choose P2P as our
testing context for the following two main reasons. First, we have rich and objective
information on the borrowers, the loans and the loan performance during our study
period. We know a large amount of borrower information disclosed from their personal
and credit files. Such quantitative information is the basis for loan underwriting in offline
debt finance. We also know when each loan was originated and would mature, when and
how much each installment was paid, whether each loan was prepaid or not, whether each
loan was fully repaid or defaulted, and, if defaulted, how much the principal was lost. In
addition to the rich information, prepayment and default are two common phenomena
in online P2P market [Duarte et al., 2012]. All aforementioned information is seldom
available from traditional offline debt financial institutions. Online P2P lending provides
a good opportunity to test the predictive power of our proposed model.
The proposed WDR outperforms other popular predictive models widely used by
academics and industries in both time to event modeling and classification of loan payoff
and default. Specifically, WDR’s performance is better than the Fine-Gray model and the
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random survival forests when predicting the cumulative incidence functions, and better
than these two models and a neural network in terms of both classification accuracy and
area under the ROC curve (AUC). Moreover, we find the inclusion of soft information (i.e.,
information cannot be easily quantified by credit history or financial and employment
status but available on Prosper) leads to a remarkable improvement in prediction. We
also demonstrate the wisdom of the crowd in distinguishing loans with a high risk of
default, but not as much in avoiding loans tending to be paid off early.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we propose WDR and show its properties.
Section 3 shows how our Bayesian inference deals with missing event time or type and
truncated event time including censoring. In Section 4 we use synthetic data to show
WDR’s nonlinear modeling capacity and its outstanding performance. In Section 5 we
analyze the Prosper data to show the feature effects on loan default and early payoff and
the value of soft information that may be overlooked by traditional financial institutions.
Section 6 concludes. We defer all proofs and algorithms, and a part of experimental
settings to the appendix.
2 Weibull racing survival model for competing events
We first introduce a property of Weibull racing describing the distribution of the mini-
mum of Weibull-distributed random variables and show how this property can be directly
used for time-to-event modeling of competing events. Then we propose Weibull racing
model assuming monotonically accelerating or decelerating covariate effects on the time
to competing events, and Weibull delegate racing model where covariates can have mono-
tonic or arbitrarily non-monotonic effects on the event time and the survival and hazard
functions.
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2.1 Property of the minimum of Weibull random variables
Let t ∼Weibull(a, λ) represent duration t following a Weibull distribution with the prob-
ability density function f(t | a, λ) = aλta−1e−λta , t ∈ R+ and the cumulative distribution
function F (t | a, λ) = 1− e−λta , t ∈ R+ where R+ represents the nonnegative side of the
real line, a > 0 is the shape parameter and λ > 0 such that E[t] = λ−1/aΓ(1 + 1/a).
Shown below is a property that characterizes a race among independent Weibull random
variables.
Property 1 (Weibull racing). If tj ∼Weibull(a, λj), where j = 1, . . . , J , are independent
to each other, then t = min{t1, . . . , tJ} and the argument of the minimum y = argmin
j∈{1,...,J}
tj
are independent and they satisfy
t ∼ Weibull
(
a,
∑J
j=1
λj
)
, y ∼ Categorical
(
λ1
/∑J
j=1
λj, · · · , λJ
/∑J
j=1
λj
)
. (1)
Intuitively, Suppose there is a race among team j = 1, · · · , J , whose completion time
tj follows Weibull(a, λj), with the winner being the team with the minimum completion
time. Property 1 shows the winner’s completion time t still follows a Weibull distribution
and is independent of which team wins the race. In the context of time-to-event modeling,
we can regard a competing event as a team and the latent time to this event as the
completion time of the team. Since the occurrence of one competing event precludes
others, y indicating which is the first event to happen will be the observed event type, and
t will be the observed event time. Weibull racing not only describes a natural mechanism
of surviving under competing events but also provides an attractive modeling framework
amenable to Bayesian inference; conditioning on a and λj’s, the joint distribution of the
event type y and time to event t becomes fully factorized as
P (y, t | a, {λj}1,J) = λyata−1e−ta
∑J
j=1 λj (2)
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which allows Bayesian inference by MCMC.
2.2 Weibull racing for linear covariate effects
We show how to model the covariate dependence of event time in the Weibull rac-
ing framework by introducing gamma-mixed Weibull distribution. Specifically, let λ ∼
Gamma(r, 1/b) represent a gamma distribution with E[λ] = r/b and Var[λ] = r/b2. If
t ∼ Weibull(a, λ) where λ ∼ Gamma(r, 1/b), we have the marginal density of t given a,
r and b as
f(t | a, r, b) = ∫∞
0
Weibull(t; a, λ)Gamma(λ; r, 1/b)dλ = arb
rta−1
(b+ta)r+1
.
This gamma-mixed Weibull distribution has a decreasing density f(t | a, r, b) (or equiva-
lently, uni-modal at 0) if a ≤ 1, and has a uni-mode at ( ab−b
1+ar
)
1
a if a > 1. Note that this
property of uni-modality is analogous to that of the regular Weibull distribution. We
define Weibull racing model as follows.
Definition 1. With competing events j ∈ {1, . . . , J} and their associated latent event
time tj, Weibull racing model has the observed event time t and event type y depending
on covariates x as
t = ty, y = argminj∈{1,...,J} tj, tj ∼Weibull(a, λj), λj ∼ Gamma(rj, exβj). (3)
We apply this definition to the scenario of borrowers’ loan payoff (j = 1) and default
(j = 2) that are two competing events. Before the outcome of the loan is observed, the
payoff time t1 and default time t2 are latent. If the payoff happens earlier than default,
i.e., t1 < t2, we observe the loan fully repaid (i.e., y = 1) at time t = t1. Otherwise, we
observe the default happens (i.e., y = 2) at time t = t2. An alternative view of Weibull
racing is from the perspective of a discrete choice model [Hanemann, 1984, Greene, 2003,
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Train, 2009]. The observed event type y is corresponding to the event whose latent arrival
time is the minimum among all the competing events. Distinct from ordinary discrete
choice models where the decision is made to maximize latent utility, the event type y is
determined by Weibull racing to minimize the waiting time for any one of the competing
events, and this minimum waiting time t is also of interest.
For the observed event time t = minj tj, the survival funcation and the hazard func-
tion, respectively, are
S(t) =
∏
j
(ex
′βj ta + 1)−rj , h(t) =
−dS(t)/dt
S(t)
=
∑
j
arjt
a−1
ta + e−x′βj
. (4)
For each competing event j, we can express its event time as tj ∼ Weibull(a, ex′βjλj0)
where λj0 ∼ Gamma(rj, 1) so that log tj = −x′βj/a+ log tj0 where tj0 ∼Weibull(a, λj0).
Thus Weibull racing is an accelerated failure time model [Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2011]
for each competing event j in that the features x accelerate or decelerate the baseline
event time tj0 by β/a. Furthermore, with Sj0(t) = (t
a + 1)−rj and hj0(t) =
arjt
a−1
1+ta
, we
can write the survival function for event j as Sj(tj) = (e
x′βj ta + 1)−rj = Sj0(tjex
′βj/a)
and write the corresponding hazard function as hj(tj) =
arjt
a−1
j
taj+e
−x′βj = e
x′βj/ahj0(tje
x′βj/a).
Weibull racing can be restricted in that the survival function and the hazard function
for event j are monotonic in x. Consequently, Weibull racing can only model competing
events whose respective event time is linearly dependent on features. An overall nonlinear
feature effect may result from multiple latent mechanisms of one competing event which is
often pre-defined without a fine-grained categorization. For example, in medical research
where survival analysis is widely applied, the nosology of competing events is often subject
to human knowledge, diagnostic techniques, and patient population. Diseases with the
same phenotype, categorized into one competing event, might have distinct etiology and
different impacts on survival, and thus require different therapies. An example of an
event with subordinate categories is diabetes which can be divided into Type 1 and Type
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2. Type 1 is ascribed to insufficient production of insulin from the pancreas whereas
Type 2 arises from the cells’ failure in responding properly to insulin Varma et al. [2014].
In areas of social sciences, fine-grained categorizations of a competing event can be
hard to pre-define, and consequently, the feature effects can be nonlinear since the com-
peting event may be an aggregation of many sub-events. In this regard, it is often
necessary for a model to identify these sub-events, not only to improve the fit of event
time, but also to explore the underlying mechanisms. We develop Weibull delegate rac-
ing, assuming that an event consists of several sub-events under each of which the latent
sub-event time is log-linearly accelerated by covariates.
2.3 Weibull delegate racing for nonlinear covariate effects
Based on the idea of Weibull racing that an individual’s observed event time is the
minimum of latent time to competing events, we further propose Weibull delegate racing
(WDR), assuming that the time to a competing event is the minimum of the latent time
to a number of sub-events appertaining to this competing event. In particular, let us first
denote Gj ∼ ΓP(G0j, 1/c0j) as a gamma process defined on the product space R+ × Ω,
where G0j is a finite and continuous base measure over a complete separable metric space
Ω, and 1/c0j is a positive scale parameter such that Gj(A) ∼ Gamma(G0j(A), 1/c0j) for
each Borel set A ⊂ Ω. A draw from the gamma process consists of countably infinite
non-negatively weighted atoms, expressed as Gj =
∑∞
k=1 rjkδβjk . Now we formally define
WDR model as follows.
Definition 2 (Weibull delegate racing). With competing events j ∈ {1, . . . , J} and their
associated latent event time tj, and given a random draw of a gamma process Gj ∼
ΓP(G0j, 1/c0j), expressed as Gj =
∑∞
k=1 rjkδβjk , for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, Weibull delegate
11
racing models the observed event time t and event type y given covariates x as
t = ty, y = argmin
j∈{1,...,J}
tj, tj = tjκj , κj = argmin
k∈{1,...,∞}
tjk,
tjk ∼Weibull(a, λjk), λjk ∼ Gamma(rjk, ex′βjk). (5)
Here we assume an infinite number of sub-events under a competing event j, and
each sub-event k has a latent event time tjk. WDR can be considered as a two-phase
race. In the first phase, for a pre-specified competing event j, there is a race among
its countably infinite sub-events {k | k = 1, . . . ,∞}, and the winner, say sub-event κj,
whose time tjκj = mink tjk, represents the event j by letting tj be equal to tjκj . In the
second phase, J events with the associated event time {tj}j compete with each other to
eventually determine both the observed event time t and the observed event type y.
Although WDR assumes a potentially infinite number of sub-events for each com-
peting event, the summation of the weights of these sub-events, Gj =
∑∞
k=1 rjkδβjk , is
finite according to the gamma process. Therefore, the gamma process not only admits a
race among a potentially infinite number of sub-events, but also parsimoniously shrinks
toward zero the weights of negligible ones [Zhou et al., 2016, Zhou, 2016], so that the
non-monotonic covariate effects on the time to a competing event can be interpreted as
the minimum, which is a nonlinear operation, of time to sub-events whose accelerating
factor is log-linear in covariates x.
Intuitively, the nonlinear modeling capacity of WDR is fulfilled by taking the min-
imum of the minimums which is a two-step nonlinear operation. In mathematics, the
event time tj, the survival function Sj(tj) and the hazard function hj(tj) for competing
event j are no longer monotonic in x. Specifically, the following corollary explicitly shows
an equivalent definition of WDR and its nonlinear modeling capacity.
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Corollary 1. Weibull delegate racing can also be expressed as
t = ty, y = argminj tj, tj ∼Weibull
(
a,
∑∞
k=1
ex
′βjk λ˜jk
)
, λ˜jk ∼ Gamma(rjk, 1). (6)
The survival function and the hazard function, respectively, for event j are
Sj(tj) =
∏
k
(1 + taje
x′βjk)−rjk , hj(tj) =
−dSj(tj)/dtj
Sj(tj)
=
∑
k
arjkt
a−1
j
taj + e
−x′βjk . (7)
Corollary 1 represents WDR as a generalization of Weibull racing, where the scale of
the time to a competing event j is proportional to a weighted summation of a countably
infinite number of gamma random variables with covariate-dependent weights. More-
over, the survival and hazard functions are non-monotonic in the features; they can be
adaptively flexible as the weights rjk’s are learned from data. To study how the hazard
function changes over time, we note that
dhj(tj)
dtj
=
∑
k
a(a− 1)rjke−x′βjkta−2 − arjkt2a−2
(ta + e−x′βjk)2
.
So if a ≤ 1, hj(tj) is always decreasing in tj, and otherwise hj(tj) can be increasing (until
some time that is long enough) or arbitrarily non-monotonic in tj with proper values of
rjk’s and βjk’s.
3 Bayesian inference
In this section, we propose an efficient MCMC inference for WDR. The fully factor-
ized likelihood admits Gibbs sampling updates of all the parameters except the Weibull
shape a whose full conditional distribution is unimodal so that an efficient slice sampling
scheme [Damlen et al., 1999, Neal et al., 2003] can be used. Moreover, we show that
our proposed MCMC inference is still applicable even if the data has missing event types
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and truncated or missing event time. In section 3.1 we use notations of Weibull rac-
ing for brevity to illustrate how the likelihood can be written in a fully factorized form
with data augmentation tricks, and the tricks apply to and the corresponding conclu-
sions hold for WDR. Section 3.2 gives the full hierarchical representation of WDR that
facilitates MCMC inference and parameter shrinkage to avoid overfit. Additionally, we
propose maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimations using stochastic gradient descent for
big data analysis. Note that we use reparameterization for feasible gradient calculation
and use self normalization for variance reduction. The details of the MAP estimations
are provided in the appendix.
3.1 Fully factorized likelihood
In survival analysis, it is rarely the case that both y and t are observed for all observations,
and one often need to deal with missing data or right or left censoring. We write t ∼
WeibullΨ(a, λ) as a truncated Weibull random variable defined by the density function
fΨ(t | a, λ) = aλta−1e−λta/
∫
Ψ
aλua−1e−λu
a
du, where t ∈ Ψ and Ψ is an open interval on R+
representing censoring. Specifically, Ψ can be (Tr.c.,∞) indicating right censoring with
censoring time Tr.c., (0, Tl.c.) indicating left censoring with censoring time Tl.c., or a more
general case (T1, T2), T2 > T1. If we don’t observe y or t, or there exists censoring, we
have the following two scenarios in both of which it is necessary to introduce appropriate
auxiliary variables to achieve fully factorized likelihoods: 1) If we only observe y (or
t), then we can draw t (or y) shown in (1) as an auxiliary variable, leading to the
fully factorized likelihood as in (2); 2) If we don’t observe t but know t ∈ Ψ with
P (t ∈ Ψ | a, {λj}j) =
∫
Ψ
a(
∑
j λj)u
a−1e−u
a
∑
j λjdu, then we draw t ∼WeibullΨ(a,
∑
j λj),
resulting in the likelihood
P
(
t, t ∈ Ψ | a,
∑
j
λj
)
= fΨ
(
t | a,
∑
j
λj
)
P
(
t ∈ Ψ | a,
∑
j
λj
)
= a
(∑
j
λj
)
ta−1e−t
a
∑
j λj .
(8)
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Together with y which can be drawn by (1) if missing, the likelihood P (y, t, t ∈
Ψ | {λj}1,J) becomes the same as in (2). The procedure of sampling t and/or y which
generates fully factorized likelihoods under different censoring conditions plays a crucial
role as a data augmentation scheme that will be used for the MCMC inference of the
proposed Weibull (delegate) racing model. While in the case of right censoring y is
unknown and the likelihood P (t > T | a, {λj}) = e−Ta
∑
j λj is already fully factorized,
we still need to augment t and y, and use (2) as the likelihood. For the convenience of
implementation, as in Zhou and Carin [2015], we truncate the total number of atoms of
a gamma process to be K that is large enough by choosing a finite and discrete base
measure as G0j =
∑K
k=1
γ0j
K
δβjk .
3.2 Hierarchical model of WDR and MCMC inference
With xi denoting the covariates, yi event type, and ti the time to event of observation i,
we express the full hierarchical form of WDR defined in (5), as
ti = tiyi , yi = argmin
j∈{1,...,J}
tij, tij = tijκij , κij = argmin
k∈{0,...,K}
tijk,
tijk ∼Weibull(a, λijk), λijk ∼ Gamma(rjk, ex′iβjk), k = 1, · · · , K,
βjk ∼
P∏
g=1
N (0, α−1gjk), αgjk ∼ Gamma(a0, 1/b0), rjk ∼ Gamma(γ0j/K, 1/c0j),
where k = 1, · · · , K, i = 1, · · · , n, and j = 1, · · · , J . We further let γ0j ∼ Gamma(e0, 1/f0),
c0j ∼ Gamma(e1, 1/f1), r0 ∼ Gamma(e0, 1/f0), and set e0 = f0 = e1 = f1 = 0.01. The
Gamma prior on the precision parameter α for each element of β is imposed to penalize
large absolute values of β to avoid overfit [Tipping, 2001].
Since left censoring is uncommon and not shown in the Prosper data to be analyzed,
we only consider right censoring in our inference and leave to readers other types of
censoring which can be analogously done. All the parameters can be inferred by Gibbs
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sampling except the Weibull shape parameter a. To the best of our knowledge, there
does not exist a Gibbs sampling scheme for the Weibull shape parameter. Alternatively,
we use an efficient slice sampling update for a without any tuning parameter as its full
conditional distribution is unimodal. The proof of this unimodality and the complete
MCMC algorithm are provided in the appendix.
4 Model validation by synthetic data
In this section, we validate the proposed WDR model using synthetic data by comparing
WDR with some benchmark approaches whose implementations and experiment settings
are deferred to the appendix for brevity. Specifically, we compare the proposed WDR
model, Fine-Gray proportional subdistribution hazards model (FG) [Fine and Gray, 1999]
and random survival forests (RF) [Ishwaran et al., 2014] that are all designed for survival
modeling of competing events. We show that WDR not only can tell whether the covariate
effects are monotonic or not by inferring the number of remarkable sub-events but also
performs uniformly well in both situations.
4.1 Quantification measurements
We quantify the survival model performance by the cause-specific concordance index
[Wolbers et al., 2014] and the Brier score [Gerds et al., 2008, Steyerberg et al., 2010].
Specifically, the Brier score (BS) for risk j at time t is calculated as
BSj(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[1(ti ≤ t, yi = j)− P (ti ≤ t, yi = j)]2 ,
16
with a smaller value indicating a better model fit. Cause-specific concordance index
(C-index) of event j at time t is computed as
Cj(t) = P (Scorej(xi, t) > Scorej(xi′ , t) | yi = j and [ti < ti′ or yi′ 6= j]) ,
where i 6= i′ and Scorej(xi, t) is a prognostic score at time t depending on xi such that
its higher value reflects a higher risk of event j. Wolbers et al. [2014] write C-index
as a weighted average of time-dependent AUC that is related to sensitivity, specificity,
and ROC curves for competing events [Saha and Heagerty, 2010]. So a higher value of
C-index indicates a better model fit and a value around 0.5 implies a model failure.
A good choice of the prognostic score is the cumulative incidence function (CIF),
i.e, Scorej(xi, t) = CIFj(i, t) = P (ti ≤ t, yi = j) [Fine and Gray, 1999, Kalbfleisch
and Prentice, 2011, Crowder, 2001]. Distinct from a survival function that measures the
probability of surviving beyond some time, CIF estimates the probability that an event
occurs by a specific time in the presence of competing events. For WDR given a, {rjk}
and {βjk},
CIFj(i, t) = P (ti ≤ t, yi = j) = E
[ ∑
k λijk∑
j′,k λij′k
(
1− e−ta
∑
j′,k λij′k
) | a, {rjk}, {βjk}] ,
where the expectation is taken over {λijk}j,k and λijk ∼ Gamma(rjk, ex′iβjk). The ex-
pectation can be evaluated by Monte-Carlo estimation if we have point estimates or a
collection of post-burn-in MCMC samples of rjk and βjk.
4.2 Synthetic data analysis
We simulate two data sets according to the data generating process in Table 1 where
xi ∈ R3 and each coordinate is sampled from Uniform(0, 1), and use them to validate
WDR and to illustrate its nonlinear modeling capability. In Table 1, tij denotes the latent
time to event (risk) j, j = 1, 2 and ti is the observed time to event of observation i. The
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Table 1: Synthetic data generating process.
Synthetic data 1 Synthetic data 2
ti1 ∼Weibull(a = 2, ex′iβ1) ti1 ∼Weibull(a = 2, cosh(x′iβ1))
ti2 ∼Weibull(a = 2, ex′iβ2) ti2 ∼Weibull(a = 2, | sinh(x′iβ2)|)
ti = min(ti1, ti2, 2.1) ti = min(ti1, ti2, 1.3)
observed event type yi = arg minj tij if ti < Tr.c., and yi = 0 indicates right censoring
if ti = Tr.c. where the censoring time Tr.c. = 2.1 for data 1 and 1.3 for data 2. We
simulate 2,000 random observations, and use 1800 for training and the remaining 200 for
testing withoug censored observations. We randomly take 20 training/testing partitions
for each of which we evaluate the C-indices and Brier scores on the testing set at time
0.4, 0.8, 1.2, 1.6, 2.0 for data 1 and at time 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2 for data 2. Displayed in
panels (a) to (d), respectively, of Figure 1, are the sample mean ± standard deviation
of the estimated C-indices of event j = 1 and 2 by WDR, the estimated rjk’s of both
events, and the empirical density estimation of the Weibull shape a by a histogram using
the post-burn-in MCMC samples with the blue vertical line indicating the true value for
data 1. Note that Panel (c) and (d) show results of one training/testing partition but
without loss of generality. Analogous plots of results by WDR for data 2 are shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Cause-specific C-indices, shrinkage of rjk and estimation of a by WDR for
synthetic data 1.
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Figure 2: Cause-specific C-indices, shrinkage of rjk and estimation of a by WDR for
synthetic data 2.
For data 1 where the time to each of the two events depends on the covariates mono-
tonically, WDR has comparable performance with FG and slightly outperforms RF in
terms of the mean values of C-indices when t ≥ 1.2. The underperformance of RF in the
case of monotonic covariate effects has also been observed in the original paper Ishwaran
et al. [2014]. For data 2 where the event time and covariates are not monotonically re-
lated, WDR and RF at any time evaluated significantly outperform FG. Furthermore,
FG fails on this dataset as its C-indices are around 0.5 for both events as in Figure 2 (a)
and (b), respectively. Moreover, WDR slightly outperforms RF especially for event 2.
Panels (c) of Figure 1 and 2 show rjk inferred from data 1 and 2, respectively. Specifically,
both events consist of only one sub-risk for data 1, indicating linear covariate effects. By
contrast, the racing between two sub-events can approximate the complex data gener-
ating process of each of the two competing events in data 2. Panel (c) in each of the
two figures also demonstrates WDR’s shrinkage of unneeded modeling capacity. For both
synthetic data sets, Panel (d) shows a good recovery of the Weibull shape a as well as
its uncertainty by WDR. The comparable performance to RF and the shrinkage of rjk’s
justifies WDR’s data-adaptively flexible modeling capacity. In addition, we provide in
the appendix the Brier scores by FG, RF and WDR in Table 8 to 11; the Brier scores also
show comparable performances of the three models on synthetic data 1 and that WDR
and RF dominate FG on synthetic data 2.
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5 Prosper data analysis
In this section, we analyze a real data set from Prosper.com to show how features of
standard and soft information affect the time to loan payoff and default. First, we
introduce the data set that contains loans that have been fully funded after lenders’
bidding. Subsequently, we show the feature effect estimations by WDR and compare its
model performance to the Fine-Gray model and the random survival forests. We also
show the predictability of different groups of partial information and demonstrate the
wisdom of the crowd in distinguishing loans with a high risk of default.
5.1 Context and data
Our data comes from Prosper.com1 that is one of the largest P2P lending sites in the US
with over sixteen billion dollars in funded loans belonging to more than 970,000 borrowers
by 2019. The data set contains fully funded loan listings that are personal, fixed-rate
and unsecured between November 9th, 2005 and December 19th, 20102 with the term of
36 months3. We describe a typical lending process, especially features directly related to
our study. More detailed information can be found from studies of Zhang and Liu [2012]
and Lin et al. [2013].
The process starts with the creation of a loan request (known as a “listing”) that
contains information about the borrower and their request. In the posted listings, the
borrowers mainly specify the requested amount and the offered interest rates. The listing
page also includes borrowers’ standard credit information, such as debt-to-income ratio,
delinquency history, and credit lines, and borrowers self-reported information such as
income and employment status. The standard information is often called verified hard
1https://www.prosper.com/about
2Prosper.com changed its bidding mechanism on December 20th, 2010. Before this date, the platform
implemented an auction mechanism. The borrowers specified the interest rates they were willing to
accept. After this date, the platform decides the borrowers’ interest rates that are calculated using
borrowers’ information such as credit scores, income levels, and debt-to-income ratios.
3Very few loans had 12 and 72 months maturity and we exclude these observations.
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information which was extracted from the borrower’s credit report provided by a credit
agency. Lenders can view this information and place bids on listings. They can bid as
little as $25 and need to specify the minimum interest rates at which they would fund
the listing.
Successful listings that attract 100% of the requested funds become loans after the
website’s verification. Lenders with lower reservation rates win the bidding, and the con-
tract interest rate is determined by the highest reservation rates among the successful
bidders. Every month during the life cycle of the loan (usually 36 months), Prosper.com
will automatically debit the borrower’s bank account and repay the investors after de-
ducting fees. As long as the borrower makes the monthly payment in time, the loan
status is marked as “current.” Otherwise, the status will incrementally change to “late,”
“1 month late,” “2 months late,” etc. If the borrower fails to make payment for more than
four months, the loan will be marked as “defaulted.” Defaulted loans will be transferred
to third-party collection agencies designated by Prosper.com, and will negatively affect
the borrower’s personal credit score.
The data set includes features of standard information that are often used by tradi-
tional financial institutions, and features of non-standard or soft information like loan
purposes. To maintain the interpretability of coefficients β of WDR, we keep the orig-
inal scale of the continuous features, and use dummy variables for both binomial and
multinomial categorical features such as credit grades, income levels, employment sta-
tus and loan purposes. So all features have non-negative values. All the multinomial
variables have a class of “not available” which is used as the baseline category and not
included in the design matrix to avoid multicolinearity. The detailed feature descrip-
tion is given in Table 2. Features containing soft information is indicated by the bold
font. Such features include GroupMember, OrderOfListing, TotalListingOfBorrowers,
FundingOption, BorrowerMaximumRate, Duration, Images and the loan purpose which
is represented by one-hot encoding for 20 purposes, such as debt consolidation, home im-
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provement and so on (shown in the third column of Table 2). Other features containing
standard information include borrowers’ credit grades, credit and financial history, em-
ployment status, contract interest rate and so on. There are 32,904 fully funded listings
in total and they are partitioned into a training set of 29,904 and a testing set of 3,000.
All the quantifications including Brier scores, C-indices and AUCs report the results on
the testing data. Following Stepanova and Thomas [2002], we treat the loans that are
fully repaid on the 36th month as censored.
Table 2: Prosper data feature description (bold font for soft information)
Feature Description Feature Description
DebtToIncomeRatio Continuous Income:50k-75k Dummy
BankcardUtilization Continuous Income:75k-100k Dummy
AmountDelinquent In thousand dollars Income:>100k Dummy
DelinquenciesLast7Years Number of delinquencies Retired Dummy
InquiriesLast6Months Number of inquiries Full-time Dummy
PublicRecordsLast10Years Number of public records Self-employed Dummy
PublicRecordsLast12Months Number of public records Part-time Dummy
CurrentCreditLines Number of current credit lines NotEmployed Dummy
OpenCreditLines Number of open credit lines OtherEmployment Dummy
TotalCreditLines Number of total credit lines Debt consolidation Dummy
RevolvingCreditBalance in thousand dollars Home improvement Dummy
GroupMember 1 if a group member and 0 otherwise Business Dummy
IsBorrowerHomeowner 1 if a home owner and 0 otherwise Personal loan Dummy
OrderOfListing Borrower’s order of the current listing Student use Dummy
TotalListingOfBorrowers Borrower’s total number of listings Auto Dummy
AmountRequested Listing amount in thousand dollars Other Dummy
FundingOption 0 if close when funded and 1 if open for duration Baby & adoption Dummy
BorrowerMaximumRate Maximum interest rate the borrower offered Boat Dummy
ContractInterest Contract interest rate Cosmetic Dummy
Duration Number of days in which the listing is valid for Engagement ring Dummy
Images 1 if borrower has an image and 0 otherwise Green loans Dummy
CreditGrade: AA Dummy Household expenses Dummy
CreditGrade: A Dummy Large purchase Dummy
CreditGrade: B Dummy Medical/dental Dummy
CreditGrade: C Dummy Motorcycle Dummy
CreditGrade: D Dummy RV Dummy
CreditGrade: E Dummy Taxes Dummy
CreditGrade: HR Dummy Vacation Dummy
Income:1-25k Dummy Wedding Dummy
Income:25k-50k Dummy
5.2 Feature effect estimations
We found only one sub-event by WDR for both early payoff and default, respectively,
which implies that the features log-linearly accelerate or decelerate the event time and
no remarkable interaction effects on the time to payoff or the time to default. For the
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remaining analysis of the Prosper data we omit the subscript k for brevity. Since log tj =
−x′βj/a + log tj0 where tj0 ∼ Weibull(a, λj0) and λj0 ∼ Gamma(rj, 1) as discussed in
Section 2.2, eβj/a is interpreted as how x accelerate the time to event j. Concretely,
a positive coefficient indicates the corresponding covariate accelerating the event time,
whereas negative decelerating the event time. Quantitatively, with one unit increase of
xv which is the vth coordinate of x, tj will be reduced by (100 × βvj/a)%, where βvj is
the coefficient of xv for event j.
We show the estimated coefficient effects, (βj/a), j = 1, 2 with standard errors by
WDR in Figure 3 below and in Table 14 in the appendix as well. Features whose coef-
ficient is negative for both events (or negative for one event and insignificantly different
from 0 for the other event) would decelerate the time to early payoff and (or) default, so
that a loan listing with big values of such features will have a prolonged time of repaying
the principal and interest until payoff or default and thus leads to a high ROI. Meanwhile,
investors should avoid listings with features whose values are big and coefficients are pos-
itive for both events (or whose coefficients are positive for one event and insignificantly
different from 0 for the other event), because they expedite payoff and (or) default and
thus results in a low ROI. Features whose coefficients are of different signs for the two
events have opposite effects on the time to payoff and to default and their effects on ROI
need to be analyzed quantitatively.
We summarize in Table 3 the features with a significant effect on the time to both
early payoff and default. For example, a higher number of total credit lines accelerates
the time to both events, while a higher bank card utilization decelerates the time to both
events. Instead of accelerating or decelerating payoff and default simultaneously, many
features have opposite effects on the time to the two events, as reported in the top-right
and the bottom-left cells of Table 3. For example, a borrower with an annual income over
100,000 dollars has their default time significantly postponed but they would be more
likely to pay off the debt early, compared to the condition that their income was lower. It
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is also implied that if a borrower would like to accept a high-interest rate when proposing
the loan listing, they are likely to pay off the loan late or to default early. A possible
explanation is that borrowers who propose a high-interest rate on Prosper have either
a high risk of default and late repayment or an urgent need for money that cannot be
funded quickly by a traditional financial institution. So in addition to facilitating the loan
funding procedure, proposing a high-interest rate helps the borrowers with a high risk of
default to attract risk-seeking investors to make an adverse selection. In comparison, a
high contract interest rate accelerates the time to default but does not influence the time
to payoff when fixing all other features. The effect and the predictability of the contract
interest rate will be discussed in detail in Section 5.4.
Table 3: Features with significant effects by WDR.
Accelerating early payoff time Decelerating early payoff time
Accelerating AmountRequested, PublicRecordsLast10Years,
default time TotalCreditLines, OtherEmployment IsBorrowerHomeowner, OrderOfListing,
InquiriesLast6Months, BorrowerMaximumRate
Decelerating TotalListingOfBorrowers, FundingOption,
default time CreditGrade:AA, A, B, C, D, E and HR, Income:>100k, BankcardUtilization
Category:Debt Consolidation, Auto and Other
It is worth to note that the accelerating and decelerating effects on the time to early
payoff and default, respectively, are basically decreasing with borrowers’ credit grades
changing from high to low (compared to the baseline of unknown credit grades), as
shown in Figure 3 (b). This also results in a trade-off between early payoff and early
default when lenders select loan listings by the borrowers’ credit grades. Additionally,
soft information is important in predicting not only the chance of payoff and default
[Iyer et al., 2015] but also the time. For example, Figure 3 (a) shows that if a borrower
provides an image (image=1), their default time will be postponed. Panel (c) shows that a
loan for auto or home improvement has significantly postponed default time if defaulted,
potentially because borrowers applying for such loans have anticipated a better financial
status and thus are less likely to default.
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Figure 3: Feature effects (β/a) with standard errors from WDR.
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Figure 4: Feature coefficients (θ) with standard errors from FG model.
5.3 Model comparison
We compare our results by WDR with other survival and classification models to examine
the credibility of the findings by WDR. First, we compare the calibration of feature effects
by FG model which formulates subdistribution hazard function ηj for event j with a
proportional-hazards assumption, i.e.,
ηj(i, t |xi) = lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
Pr(t ≤ ti < t+ ∆t, yi = j | ti ≥ t or (ti ≤ t and yi 6= j),xi)
= ηj0(t) exp(x
′
iθj),
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where ηj0(t) is a nonparametric baseline and θj is the covariate coefficients to be esti-
mated. A positive value of xv with a positive coefficient θvj will increase the subdistri-
bution hazard. In comparison, for WDR with one sub-event for each of the competing
events, the hazard function for event j is increasing in xv if βvj > 0 as implied by (4).
Therefore, if the parameters of WDR is correctly estimated, the signs of βj should be
the same as those of θj for each j unless insignificant. We show the estimated θj with
the standard errors in Figure 4 and Table 14 in the appendix, and see that all the point
estimates of feature effects are of the same sign, respectively, as those by WDR if signif-
icant, and the relative scales of the coefficients are also similar between WDR and FG.
In addition, the model fit by WDR which finds linear covariate effects is comparable to,
and for some time evaluated slightly better than the model fits by FG and random RF
in terms of C-indices and Brier scores as shown in Table 12 and 13, respectively, in the
appendix.
We can predict P (yi = j), the over-all probability of event j for observation i using
CIFj(i, t =∞), and consequently, a survival model for competing events like WDR, FG
and RF can be used for classification of the event types. We show how well WDR does
in distinguishing loans to be fully paid off from those to be defaulted, and compare it
with FG and RF along with classification approaches including L2-regularized logistic
regression and a neural network with fully connected layers. Note that neural networks
are arguably the most powerful classification models in the existence of nonlinearity if
the data is large enough. We use the probability of 0.5 as the classification threshold
and report in Table 4 the prediction accuracy and area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve which is denoted as AUC. We can see WDR gives very good
prediction accuracy and AUC that are higher than all the other approaches except for
slightly lower than logistic regression. It is worth to mention that the neural network
classification may have over-fit the training data since the training accuracy has achieved
as high as 97.6% whereas the testing accuracy and AUC are the lowest among all the
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Table 4: Prediction accucary and AUC for classification of early payoff and default.
logistic neural network FG RF WDR
Accuracy 0.7373 0.6893 0.7350 0.7200 0.7353
AUC 0.8049 0.7638 0.7995 0.8002 0.8046
methods compared.
5.4 Prediction by partial information
Table 5: Brier scores by WDR using different features.
Early payoff Default
time Interest rate Credit grade Standard info All info Interest rate Credit grade Standard info All info
5 0.0778 0.0775 0.0761 0.0760 0.0151 0.0147 0.0163 0.0172
10 0.1472 0.1459 0.1353 0.1323 0.0806 0.0807 0.0782 0.0744
15 0.1887 0.1866 0.1680 0.1618 0.1414 0.1434 0.1362 0.1249
20 0.2143 0.2114 0.1891 0.1800 0.1767 0.1794 0.1698 0.1534
25 0.2289 0.2255 0.2006 0.1889 0.1952 0.1982 0.1879 0.1694
30 0.2368 0.2331 0.2091 0.1951 0.2078 0.2109 0.2000 0.1802
35 0.2396 0.2360 0.2145 0.1962 0.2168 0.2204 0.2073 0.1864
Table 6: C-indices by WDR using different features.
Early payoff Default
time Interest rate Credit grade Standard info All info Interest rate Credit grade Standard info All info
5 0.5385 0.5537 0.6744 0.7091 0.7991 0.7395 0.8127 0.8424
10 0.5539 0.5761 0.6982 0.7290 0.7314 0.7114 0.7557 0.8115
15 0.5608 0.5765 0.6970 0.7296 0.7065 0.6829 0.7245 0.7860
20 0.5687 0.5817 0.6918 0.7268 0.6930 0.6713 0.7138 0.7756
25 0.5784 0.5887 0.6897 0.7279 0.6804 0.6582 0.7019 0.7729
30 0.5830 0.5910 0.6828 0.7229 0.6747 0.6535 0.6959 0.7945
35 0.5926 0.5951 0.6756 0.7199 0.6697 0.6472 0.6928 0.7504
Table 7: Classification accuracy and AUC by WDR using different features.
Interest rate Credit grade Standard info All info
Accucary 0.6280 0.6257 0.6623 0.7353
AUC 0.6825 0.6546 0.7345 0.8046
In previous sections, we have validated WDR from the modeling perspective by show-
ing its data-adaptive nonlinear capacity and comparable performance to other popular
methods in survival analysis and classification. In this section, we study the predictabil-
ity of the Prosper features containing standard and soft information using WDR. We
use the contract interest rate, credit grades, all standard information and all information
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(whose prediction results have already been discussed in Section 5.3), respectively, to fit
the WDR model and compare the predictability of these groups of features by examining
the goodness of CIF estimations that is quantified by Brier scores and C-indices, and
how accurately WDR distinguishes loan payoff and default. As the contract interest rate
reflects lenders’ evaluation of a loan listing, its predictability suggests how well lenders
are making decisions. The credit grades stratify borrowers by their past behavior and
summarize the borrowers’ overall creditworthiness. By comparing the predictability of
the two features we can see if lenders can acquire information of borrowers in addition to
their credit history. Furthermore, compared to only using standard information we ex-
amine the improvement by using soft information which can be overlooked by traditional
financial institutions.
Only one sub-event for early payoff and default, respectively, has been found by WDR
for each of these four groups of features. So the feature effects are linear. We report the
Brier scores in Table 5, C-indices in Table 6 and the classification accuracy and AUC in
Table 7, respectively. Overall, the prediction using all information dominates those using
the other groups of partial information. Compared to using the standard information,
using additional soft information leads to a remarkable improvement in the prediction of
the default probability and time. In particular, using additional soft information results
in an increase of 0.0701 or 9.54% in AUC compared to using standard information alone.
Note that an increase of 0.01 in AUC is a considerable improvement when predicting
the loan default [Iyer et al., 2015]. The CIF is also better estimated using additional
soft information as shown by the smaller values of Brier scores and the larger values of
C-indices. The only exception lies in the Brier score at time = 5, indicating a default
at the fifth month can be slightly better predicted by the credit grade or the contract
interest rate alone. The quantification by C-indices does not show such an exception.
When predicting the CIF for loan default, WDR using the contract interest rate
slightly outperforms WDR using the credit grade in terms of both Brier scores and C-
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indices. Meanwhile, the prediction of the overall default probability using the contract
interest rate alone is better than that using the credit grades; the difference of AUC
is as large as 0.028. Moreover, the predictability of the contract interest rate on the
CIF for loan default achieves, on average, 97.2% of standard information and 89.5% of
all (standard and soft) information in terms of C-indices. So the contract interest rate
determined by bidding contains a tremendous proportion of all information available
and reflects lenders’ accurate judgment of loan default. When predicting the CIF for
loan payoff, however, the contract interest rate and the credit grades do not capture as
much useful information as they do in predicting the default. Concretely, the C-indices by
using the contract interest rate, which are all below 0.6 at the time evaluated, only achieve
82.7% and 78.5% of those using standard information and all information, respectively.
This indicates that the crowd wisdom cares about the loan default (time and probability)
more than the early payoff.
6 Conclusion and future work
The proposed Weibull delegate racing model for survival analysis with competing events
uses a two-phase race among sub-events, not only maintaining the interpretability, but
also allowing for non-monotonic feature effects. We use a gamma process to support
a potentially countably infinite number of sub-events, and rely on its inherent shrink-
age mechanism to remove unneeded model capacity, making WDR capable of detecting
underlying mechanisms data-adaptively. Moreover, WDR does not break the noninfor-
mative censoring assumption and thus reduces the bias in CIF estimations. Analysis of
the Prosper data shows WDR’s outstanding performance and intriguing findings that
can inspire investors to screen online loan listings using standard and soft information.
The interpretation of WDR as an accelerated failure time model enables us to both qual-
itatively and quantitatively summarize the feature effects on time to default and payoff.
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Therefore, WDR is an attractive alternative to existing methods for not only study-
ing loan payoff and default but also many other applications that require interpretable
nonlinear modeling capacity.
Many different model extensions and applications have been left for the future. From
the modeling perspective, WDR assumes the (sub-)events are conditionally independent
given the features and has not considered an intrinsic correlation. A possible improve-
ment is to add random effects to capture the correlation among competing events and
among their associated sub-events, respectively. We have tried this on the prosper data
but did not find significant random effects, possibly because the standard and soft infor-
mation already capture the potential correlation between the time to payoff and the time
to default. This conditional-independence assumption may not hold in more complex
scenarios where the features are sparse or do not have much predictability. For example,
if a patient had multiple diseases and they died of one disease, their survival time may be
different from those who had the same values of features and died of the same disease. In
this case, the interaction between diseases cannot be reflected by measurable pathology
indices and thus the latent survival times to these diseases are not conditionally indepen-
dent given the features. We believe that adding random effects can remarkably improve
WDR’s performance in such cases.
We do not find nonlinear feature effects as WDR has learned only one sub-event for
payoff and default, respectively, from the data. This finding is valuable as it shows bor-
rowers’ features on Prosper.com are informative for lenders to easily make good decisions
to avoid loans with high risks of default. As we have selected the data of fully funded
loans in the time period when the bidding system was in use, the data may be of high ho-
mogeneity and thus interactions among features may not be significant; nonlinear feature
effects might emerge if we analyze more loans in a longer period of time. Another appli-
cation of WDR using the Prosper data is to study the loan funding process. Specifically,
within the funding period a proposed listing may have two endpoints as two competing
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events; one is fully funded and the other is withdrawal by borrowers.
Another WDR’s application area is in biomedical studies where the pre-specification
of competing events is subject to human knowledge and diagnostic techniques, so that
a competing event is very likely to include several unknown sub-events. We have an-
alyzed a microarray gene-expression data of 240 patients with diffuse large B-cell lym-
phoma (DLBCL) [Rosenwald et al., 2002]. Multiple unsuccessful treatments to increase
the survival rate suggest that there exist several subtypes of DLBCL that differ in re-
sponsiveness to chemotherapy. In the DLBCL dataset, Rosenwald et al. [2002] identify
three gene-expression subgroups, including activated B-cell-like, germinal-center B-cell-
like, and “type 3” which may be related to three different diseases as a result of distinct
mechanisms of malignant transformation. They also suspect that “type 3” may be associ-
ated with more than one such mechanism. We use WDR to study the survival under the
three types of DLBCL, and have found that “type 3” actually consists of two sub-types.
This finding demonstrate the huge success of WDR in discovering new diseases.
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Weibull Racing Time-to-event Modeling and
Analysis of Online Borrowers’ Loan Payoff and
Default: Appendix
A Theorems and proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Since P (t > τ) =
∏
j P (tj > τ) = e
−τa∑j λj , then t = minj tj ∼
Weibull(a,
∑
j λj). Assuming th = minj tj, we have
P (τ < min
j
tj, th = min
j
tj) =
∏
j 6=h
P (τ < th < tj)
=
∫ ∞
τ
f(th | a, λh)
∏
j 6=h
P (th < tj)dth
=
∫ ∞
τ
e−t
a
h
∑
j 6=h λjaλht
a−1
h e
−λhtahdth
=
λh∑
j λj
e−τ
a
∑
j λj .
Let τ = 0. We have P (th = minj tj) =
λh∑
j λj
. This proves the categorical distribution of
y = argmin
j
tj. Consequently,
P (τ < min tj, th = min
j
tj) = P (τ < t, y = h) = P (τ < t)P (y = h).
This proves the independence between t and y.
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A.2 Marginal distribution of the WDR event time
Theorem A.1. If ti ∼Weibull(a, λi••) with λi•• =
∑
j,k λijk and λijk ∼ Gamma(rjk, 1/bijk),
the PDF of ti given a, {rjk} and {bijk} is
f(ti | {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k) = ata−1i ci
∞∑
m=0
(ρi +m)δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi+m
,
and the cumulative density function (CDF) is
P (ti < q | {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k) = 1− ci
∞∑
m=0
δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(qa + bi(1))ρi+m
, (9)
where ci =
∏
j,k
(
bijk
bi(1)
)rjk
, bi(1) = maxj,k bijk, ρi =
∑
j,k rjk, δi0 = 1, δim+1 =
1
m+1
∑m+1
h=1 hγihδim+1−h
for m ≥ 1, and γih =
∑
j,k
rjk
h
(
1− bijk
bi(1)
)h
.
It is difficult to utilize the PDF or CDF of ti in the form of series, but we can use
a finite truncation as an approximate. Concretely, as P (ti < ∞| a, {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k) =
ci
∑∞
m=0 δim = 1, we find an M so large that ci
∑M
m=0 δim close to 1 (say no less than
0.9999), and use 1−ci
∑M
m=0
δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(qa+bi(1))
ρi+m
as an approximation. Consequently, sampling ti
is feasible by inverting the approximated CDF for general cases. We have tried prediction
by finite truncation on some synthetic data where a = 1 and found M is mostly between
10 and 30, which is computationally acceptable.
Proof. We first study the distribution of gamma convolution. Specifically, if λt
ind∼
Gamma(rt, 1/bt) with rt, bt ∈ R+, then the PDF of λ =
∑T
t=1 can be written in a form
of series Moschopoulos [1985] as
f(λ | r1, b1, · · · , rT , bT ) =

c
∑∞
m=0
δmλρ+m−1e
−λb(1)
Γ(ρ+m)/bρ+m
(1)
if λ > 0,
0 otherwise,
where c =
∏T
t=1
(
bt
b(1)
)rt
, b(1) = maxt bt, ρ =
∑T
t=1 rt, δ0 = 1, δm+1 =
1
m+1
∑m+1
h=1 hγhδm+1−h
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and γh =
∑T
t=1 rt
(
1− bt
b(1)
)h
/h. Moschopoulos [1985] proved that 0 < γih ≤ ρibhi0/h and
0 < δim ≤ Γ(ρi+m)b
m
i0
Γ(ρi)m!
where bi0 = maxj,k(1− bijkbi(1) ). We want to show the PDF of ti,
f(ti | {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k)
=
∫ ∞
0
f(ti |λi••)f(λi•• | {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k)dλi••
=
∫ ∞
0
∞∑
m=0
ciδimat
a
i λ
ρi+m
i•• exp(−tai λi•• − bi(1)λi••)
Γ(ρi +m)/b
ρi+m
i(1)
dλi••
=
∞∑
m=0
∫ ∞
0
ciδimat
a
i λ
ρi+m
i•• exp(−tai λi•• − bi(1)λi••)
Γ(ρi +m)/b
ρi+m
i(1)
dλi•• (10)
=ata−1i ci
∞∑
m=0
(ρi +m)δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi+m
,
which suffices to prove the equality in (10). Note that
f(ti |ni, λi••)f(λi•• | {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k)
=ata−1i ciλ
ρi
i••b
ρi
i(1) exp(−tai λi•• − bi(1)λi••)
∞∑
m=0
δimb
m
i(1)λ
m
i••
Γ(ρi +m)
≤ata−1i ciλρii••bρii(1) exp(−tai λi•• − bi(1)λi••)
∞∑
m=0
(bi0bi(1)λi••)m
Γ(ρi)m!
=ata−1i ciλ
ρi
i••b
ρi
i(1) exp(−tai λi•• − bi(1)λi•• + bi0bi(1)λi••),
which shows the uniform convergence of f(ti |ni, λi••)f(λi•• | {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k). So the
integration and countable summation are interchangeable, and consequently, (10) holds.
Next we want to calculate the CDF of ti,
P (ti < q |ni, {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k) =
∫ q
0
ata−1i ci
∞∑
m=0
(ρi +m)δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi+m
dti
=
∞∑
m=0
∫ q
0
ata−1i ci
(ρi +m)δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi+m
dti. (11)
38
It suffices to show (11). Note that
∞∑
m=0
(ρi +m)δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi+m
=
∞∑
m=0
Γ(1 + ρi +m)δimb
ρi+m
i(1)
Γ(ρi +m)(tai + bi(1))
ni+ρi+m
≤
∞∑
m=0
Γ(1 + ρi +m)b
ρi+m
i(1) Γ(1 + ρi)
Γ(ρi +m)(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi+mΓ(ρi)m!
=
Γ(ρi + 1)b
ρi
i(1)
Γ(ρi)(tai + bi(1))
1+ρi
∞∑
m=0
[
Γ(1 + ρi +m)
Γ(1 + ρi)m!
(
bi(1)
tai + bi(1)
)m]
=
Γ(ρi + 1)b
ρi
i(1)t
a(1+ρi)
i
Γ(ρi)(tai + bi(1))
2(1+ρi)
.
The last equation holds because the summation of a negative binomial probability mass
function is 1. So f(ti | a, {rjk}j,k, {bijk}j,k) is uniformly convergent and (11) holds. Cal-
culating the integration, we obtain the CDF of ti.
B MCMC algorithm for WDR
Let us denote Ti and Tic as the observed failure time and the right censoring time,
respectively, for observation i. Since left censoring is uncommon and not shown in the
Prosper data to be analyzed, we only consider right censoring in our inference and leave
to readers other types of censoring which can be analogously done. The inference by
MCMC accommodating missing event time or missing event types proceeds by iterating
the following steps.
Step 1: If yi is observed, we first sample κiyi by
P (κiyi = k | yi, · · · ) =
λiyik∑K
k′=1 λiyik′
.
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If yi is unobserved which means a missing event type, we sample (yi, κiyi) by
P (yi = j, κiyi = k | · · · ) =
λijk∑S
j′=1
∑K
k′=1 λij′k′
.
We then denote mjk =
∑
i:yi=j
1(κiyi = k). Define nijk = 1 if yi = j and κiyi = k,
and otherwise nijk = 0. The above sampling procedure means that given the
event type yi, we sample the index of the sub-event that has the minimum event
time.
Step 2: Update ti for i = 1, · · · , n, j = 1, · · · , J and k = 1, · · · , K.
(a) If the event time Ti is observed, we set ti = Ti.
(b) Otherwise, we sample ti ∼Weibull(Tic,∞)(a,
∑S
j=1
∑K
k=1 λijk) where Weibull(Tic,∞)(·, ·)
is a truncated weibull distribution so that ti ∈ (Tic,∞). Note Tic = 0 if both
event time and censoring time are missing for observation i.
Step 3: Sample (λijk | −) ∼ Gamma
(
rjk + nijk,
e
x′iβjk
1+tai e
x′
i
βjk
)
, for i = 1, · · · , n, j = 1, · · · , J
and k = 1, · · · , K.
Step 4: Sample a by slice sampling. Since a determines how the hazard varies with time,
we assume an improper prior of a ∈ R+, i.e., p(a) ∝ 1(a > 0) to reduce the
impact of the prior on the posterior.
p(a | . . .) ∝ p(a)p(ti, yii | a, . . .) = an
∏
i
[
ta−1i
∏
j,k
(
1 + tai e
x′iβjk
)nijk+rjk]
The uni-modality of p(a | . . .) can be shown so that slice sampling can be imple-
mented efficiently. Concretely,
d log p(a| . . .)/da = n
a
+
∑
i
log ti −
∑
i,j,k
(nijk + rjk)
ea log ti+x
′
iβjk log ti
1 + ea log ti+x
′
iβjk
.
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Since n
a
in decreasing in a while
∑
i,j,k(nijk+rjk)
e
a log ti+x
′
iβjk log ti
1+e
a log ti+x
′
i
βjk
is increasing in a,
there must be at most one a ∈ R+ so that d log p(a| . . .)/da = 0. So p(a| . . .) = 0
is uni-modal. We use the mcmc function in R package diversitree [FitzJohn,
2012].
Step 5: Sample βjk, for j = 1, · · · , J and k = 1, · · · , K, by Po´lya Gamma (PG) data aug-
mentation. First Sample (ωijk | −) ∼ PG(rjk+nijk,x′iβjk+a log ti). Then sample
(βjk | −) ∼ MVN(µjk,Σjk) where Σjk = (Vjk +X ′ΩjkX)−1, X = [x′1, · · · ,x′N ]′,
Ωjk = diag(ω1jk, · · · , ωnjk) and µjk = Σjk
[
−∑Ni=1 (aωijk log ti + rjk−nijk2 )xi].
Note to sample from the Po´lya-Gamma distribution, we use a fast and accurate
approximate sampler of Zhou [2016] that matches the first two moments of the
original distribution; we set the truncation level of that sampler as five.
Step 6: Sample (αvjk | −) ∼ Gamma
(
a0 + 0.5, 1/(b0 + 0.5β
2
vjk)
)
for v = 0, · · · , V , j =
1, · · · , J and k = 1, · · · , K.
Step 7: Sample rjk and γ0j, for j = 1, · · · , J and k = 1, · · · , K, by Chinese restaurant
table (CRT) data augmentation Zhou and Carin [2015].
First sample (n
(2)
ijk | −) ∼ CRT(nijk, rjk), and (ljk | −) ∼ CRT(
∑N
i=1 n
(2)
ijk, γ0j/K).
Then sample (rjk | −) ∼ Gamma
(∑N
i=1 n
(2)
ijk + γ0j/K,
1
c0j+
∑N
i=1 log(1+t
a
i e
x′
i
βjk )
)
, and
(γ0j | −) ∼ Gamma
(
e0 +
∑K
k=1 ljk,
1
f0− 1K
∑K
k=1 log(1−pjk)
)
,
where pjk =
∑N
i=1 log(1+t
a
i e
x′iβjk )
c0j+
∑N
i=1 log(1+t
a
i e
x′
i
βjk )
.
Step 8: Sample (c0j | −) ∼ Gamma
(
e1 + γ0j,
1
f1+
∑K
k=1 rjk
)
for j = 1, · · · , J .
Step 9: For j = 1, · · · , J and k = 1, · · · , K, prune sub-risk k of risk j for all observations
if mjk = 0, by setting λijk ≡ 0 and tijk ≡ ∞ for ∀i.
Step 1 through 8 are MCMC updates of parameters. Step 9 is used to explicitly prune
unneeded nonlinear modeling capacity. Although the item weights in the gamma process
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is almost surely positive, the latent count allocation of nijk and n
(2)
ijk in Step 1 and 7 make
it possible to prune a sub-event which does not significantly represent a latent mechanism
of a competing event.
C Maximum a posteriori estimations of WDR
With the reparameterization that λijk = λ˜ijke
x′iβjk where λ˜ijk
iid∼ Gamma(rjk, 1) we first
find pi, the likelihood of observation i having event type yi at event time ti.
pi = E (P (ti, yi |λi)) ≡
∫
(pti × pyi) p(λ˜i | r)dλ˜i
where λ˜i = {λ˜ijk}j,k, p(λ˜i | r) =
∏
j,k Gamma(rjk, 1), r = {rjk}j,k, Gamma(rjk, 1) is the
pdf of a gamma distribution with shape rjk and scale 1, and
pti =

ata−1i (
∑
j,k λ˜ijke
x′iβjk) exp
{
−tai
∑
jk λ˜ijke
x′iβjk
}
if ti is uncensored and observed,
exp
{
−T aic
∑
jk λ˜ijke
x′iβjk
}
if ti is right censored at Tic, i.e., ti > Tic,
1 if ti is missing, but yi is not,
pyi =

∑
k λ˜iyike
x′iβyik∑
j,k λ˜ijke
x′
i
βjk
if yi is not missing,
1 if yi is missing, but ti is not.
Note that we do not define P (ti, yi |λi) if both ti and yi are missing and remove such
observations from data. We write pti ≡ pt(λ˜i | r) and pyi ≡ py(λ˜i | r).
Imposing a prior p(a) on a, p(βjk) on βjk and p(rjk) on rjk, the log posterior is
logP =
∑
i
log pi + log p(a) +
∑
j,k
log p(βjk) +
∑
j,k
log p(rjk) + C (12)
where C is a constant function of a, {βjk} and {rjk}. In practice we assume an improper
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prior p(a) ∝ 1 on a, a Student’s t distribution with degrees of freedom α on each element
of βjk and a Gamma(0.01/K, 1/0.01) prior on rjk. We also found a Gamma(1/K, 1) prior
on rjk or an L2-regularizer, 0.001||r||2, is more numerically stable. Then we have
logP =
∑
i
log pi +
∑
v,j,k
−α + 1
2
log
(
1 + β2vjk/α
)
+
∑
j,k
[(0.01/K − 1) log rjk − 0.01rjk] + c
where c is also a constant function of a, {βjk} and {rjk}. For simplicity, we define
β = {βjk}j,k. We want to maximize logP with respect to β and r. The difficulty lies in
pi being the expectation of pti × pyi over λ˜i which is a random variable parameterized by
r. Now we show how to approximate the derivatives of log pi by Monte-Carlo simulation
and score function gradients. Specifically,
∇a,β log pi =
∫
[∇a,β (pti × pyi)] p(λ˜i | r)dλ˜i∫
(pti × pyi) p(λ˜i | r)dλ˜i
≈
1
M
∑M
m=1∇a,β
[
pt(λ˜
(m)
i | r)× py(λ˜(m)i | r)
]
1
M
∑M
m=1
[
pt(λ˜
(m)
i | r)× py(λ˜(m)i | r)
]
(13)
whereM is a reasonably large number, say 10, λ˜
(m)
i = {λ˜(m)ijk }jk and λ˜(m)ijk iid∼ Gamma(rjk, 1),
∀i = 1, · · · , n andm = 1, · · · ,M . With the fact that∇rp(λ˜i | r) = p(λ˜i | r)∇r log p(λ˜i | r),
∇r log pi =
∫ ∇r [(pti × pyi) p(λ˜i | r)] dλ˜i∫
(pti × pyi) p(λ˜i | r)dλ˜i
=
∫
(pti × pyi)∇r log p(λ˜i | r)p(λ˜i | r)dλ˜i∫
(pti × pyi) p(λ˜i | r)dλ˜i
≈
1
M
∑M
m=1 pt(λ˜
(m)
i | r)× py(λ˜(m)i | r)∇r log p(λ˜(m)i | r)
1
M
∑M
m=1
[
pt(λ˜
(m)
i | r)× py(λ˜(m)i | r)
]
=
M∑
m=1
pt(λ˜
(m)
i | r)× py(λ˜(m)i | r)∑M
m′=1
[
pt(λ˜
(m′)
i | r)× py(λ˜(m
′)
i | r)
]∇r log p(λ˜(m)i | r). (14)
Therefore, we can approximate the derivatives of logP with respect to a, β and r
by plugging in (13) and (14), respectively, and minimize − logP by (stochastic) gradient
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descent.
D Experiment settings
We run 200, 000 interations of Gibbs sampler for WDR with the gamma process truncated
at K = 10 for all experiments on the Prosper data, take the first 195, 000 as burn-in and
estimate CIF by averaging its estimators from the last 5, 000 iterations. For the synthetic
data analysis, we run 100, 000 iterations and collect the last 2000 MCMC samples. For
all experiments of random survial forests, we set the number of trees equal to 100 and the
number of splits equal to 2 as suggested by Ishwaran et al. [2014]. We use R to implement
the FG model by package cmprsk Gray [2014] and the RF model by randomForestSRC
Ishwaran and Kogalur [2018], and to calulate C-indices by package pec Gerds [2017].
We compare the classification of loan early payoff and default by FG, RF and WDR
with three other models, including L2 regularized logistic regression and a neural network.
For the logistic regression, we use 5-fold cross validation to select the tuning parameter for
the L2 penalty of the parameters from (2
−10, 2−9, . . . , 210). The neural network has three
fully connected hidden layers with the width as 150, 300, and 150, respectively, rectifier
linear units as the activation function between hidden layers and a softmax output. For
all the classification methods, an observation in the testing set is classified to the category
associated with the predictive probability greater than 0.5.
E Additional experimental results
Table 8 to 11 show the Brier scores (mean ± standard error) for each event of the
synthetic data 1 and 2, respectively. The model performance quantified by Brier score
is basically consistent with that quantified by C-indices. For synthetic data 1 where
covariates are linearly influential, the Brier scores are comparable among FG, RF and
WDR. For synthetic data 2 that has nonlinear covariate effects, the Brier scores by WDR
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and RF are smaller than those by FG. Note that the Brier scores by WDR is slightly
larger than those by RF in terms of mean for synthetic data 2 when t ≤ 0.8, but the
difference is insignificant when the standard errors are taken into account.
Table 8: Brier score for event 1 of synthetic data 1.
t=0.4 t=0.8 t=1.2 t=1.6 t=2.0
FG 0.090±0.008 0.164±0.012 0.173±0.014 0.170±0.014 0.172±0.013
RF 0.089±0.010 0.168±0.014 0.185±0.012 0.183±0.014 0.182±0.014
WDR 0.108±0.014 0.181±0.017 0.177±0.012 0.170±0.013 0.170±0.012
Table 9: Brier score for event 2 of synthetic data 1.
t=0.4 t=0.8 t=1.2 t=1.6 t=2.0
FG 0.077±0.011 0.158±0.014 0.169±0.013 0.166±0.013 0.167±0.013
RF 0.076±0.011 0.165±0.014 0.178±0.015 0.175±0.014 0.176±0.013
WDR 0.086±0.015 0.173±0.018 0.174±0.012 0.167±0.013 0.167±0.012
Table 10: Brier score for event 1 of synthetic data 2.
t=0.4 t=0.6 t=0.8 t=1.0 t=1.2
FG 0.115±0.017 0.208±0.011 0.250±0.002 0.248±0.003 0.243±0.004
RF 0.110±0.014 0.178±0.015 0.198±0.012 0.183±0.015 0.172±0.014
WDR 0.112±0.021 0.186±0.019 0.203±0.013 0.174±0.007 0.169±0.006
Table 11: Brier score for event 2 of synthetic data 2.
t=0.4 t=0.6 t=0.8 t=1.0 t=1.2
FG 0.083±0.015 0.187±0.015 0.228±0.007 0.239±0.005 0.242±0.004
RF 0.080±0.014 0.153±0.018 0.167±0.018 0.165±0.016 0.166±0.015
WDR 0.084±0.017 0.164±0.023 0.162±0.016 0.161±0.015 0.165±0.013
Table 12 and 13, respectively, provide Brier scores and C-indices at month 5, 10, · · · , 35
by FG, RF and WDR for the Prosper data analysis using all the features in Table 2. We
can see the three models deliver comparable Brier scores and C-indices at the time eval-
uated. Table 14 shows the point estimate ± standard error of the Prosper feature effects
by WDR (β/a) and FG (θ). All the point estimates by the two models are of the same
sign unless insignificant, and this demonstrate the credibility of feature effect estimation
by WDR.
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Table 12: Brier scores for Prosper data
Early payoff Default
time FG RF WDR FG RF WDR
5 0.0745 0.0717 0.0760 0.0110 0.0106 0.0172
10 0.1332 0.1274 0.1323 0.0765 0.0731 0.0744
15 0.1634 0.1587 0.1618 0.1275 0.1307 0.1249
20 0.1818 0.1783 0.1800 0.1509 0.1606 0.1534
25 0.1910 0.1909 0.1889 0.1632 0.1771 0.1694
30 0.1982 0.2001 0.1951 0.1713 0.1876 0.1802
35 0.2034 0.2052 0.1962 0.1764 0.1948 0.1864
Table 13: C-indices for Prosper data
Early payoff Default
time FG RF WDR FG RF WDR
5 0.7151 0.7205 0.7091 0.7648 0.8406 0.8424
10 0.7168 0.7327 0.7290 0.7795 0.7864 0.8115
15 0.6920 0.7257 0.7296 0.7874 0.7542 0.7860
20 0.7090 0.7202 0.7268 0.7576 0.7419 0.7756
25 0.7140 0.7133 0.7279 0.7745 0.7284 0.7729
30 0.7158 0.7049 0.7229 0.7920 0.7201 0.7945
35 0.7031 0.6977 0.7199 0.7539 0.7146 0.7504
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Table 14: Estimates of Prosper feature effects by WDR (β/a) and FG (θ)
WDR (β/a) FG (θ)
feature Early payoff Default Early payoff Default
DebtToIncomeRatio -0.039±0.030 0.012±0.029 -0.024±0.014 0.012±0.011
BankcardUtilization -0.172±0.071 -0.236±0.082 -0.134±0.030 -0.129±0.033
AmountDelinquent -0.005±0.004 0.007±0.004 -0.003±0.002 0.003±0.002
DelinquenciesLast7Years -0.012±0.002 0.002±0.002 -0.010±0.001 0.002±0.001
InquiriesLast6Months -0.074±0.008 0.076±0.006 -0.049±0.004 0.034±0.003
PublicRecordsLast10Years -0.172±0.029 0.104±0.027 -0.126±0.015 0.060±0.009
PublicRecordsLast12Months -0.062±0.13 -0.098±0.128 -0.055±0.057 -0.011±0.044
CurrentCreditLines 0.015±0.013 0.021±0.016 0.010±0.005 0.003±0.006
OpenCreditLines -0.028±0.014 -0.033±0.018 -0.021±0.006 -0.007±0.007
TotalCreditLines 0.004±0.002 0.006±0.002 0.004±0.001 0.001±0.001
RevolvingCreditBalance -0.001±0.001 0.001±0.001 -0.001±0.001 0.001±0.001
Groupmember 0.015±0.054 -0.038±0.067 0.032±0.022 -0.044±0.024
IsBorrowerHomeowner -0.132±0.045 0.22±0.057 -0.101±0.020 0.110±0.022
OrderOfListing -0.178±0.011 0.872±0.028 -0.089±0.006 0.510±0.023
TotalListingOfBorrowers 0.178±0.008 -0.848±0.027 0.095±0.005 -0.498±0.023
AmountRequested -0.047±0.005 0.078±0.006 -0.035±0.002 0.035±0.002
FundingOption 0.351±0.064 -0.221±0.074 0.268±0.027 -0.159±0.027
BorrowerMaximumRate -0.026±0.006 0.027±0.009 -0.025±0.003 0.022±0.003
ContractInterest -0.002±0.007 0.064±0.009 0.004±0.003 0.026±0.003
Duration 0.038±0.009 0.017±0.012 0.017±0.004 0.001±0.004
Images -0.042±0.044 -0.182±0.057 -0.037±0.018 -0.051±0.022
CreditGrade:AA 3.491±0.593 -3.596±0.378 2.199±0.288 -1.958±0.138
CreditGrade:A 3.225±0.588 -2.771±0.363 2.020±0.287 -1.556±0.133
CreditGrade:B 3.027±0.582 -2.222±0.352 1.849±0.287 -1.283±0.128
CreditGrade:C 2.910±0.584 -2.012±0.343 1.743±0.286 -1.190±0.125
CreditGrade:D 2.953±0.579 -1.929±0.34 1.795±0.285 -1.180±0.123
CreditGrade:E 2.883±0.580 -1.929±0.338 1.704±0.286 -1.158±0.123
CreditGrade:HR 2.737±0.582 -1.584±0.337 1.609±0.285 -1.012±0.123
Income:1-25k -0.057±0.176 0.166±0.206 -0.001±0.089 0.074±0.082
Income:25k-50k 0.009±0.164 0.150±0.190 0.064±0.085 0.084±0.076
Income:50k-75k 0.260±0.165 -0.202±0.193 0.270±0.086 -0.114±0.077
Income:75k-100k 0.379±0.170 -0.328±0.202 0.387±0.087 -0.195±0.081
Income:>100k 0.546±0.171 -0.573±0.205 0.511±0.088 -0.323±0.082
Retired -0.420±0.235 0.473±0.286 -0.380±0.111 0.306±0.113
Full-time -0.225±0.180 0.026±0.211 -0.251±0.090 0.098±0.084
Self-employed -0.143±0.189 0.414±0.218 -0.241±0.091 0.192±0.088
Part-time -0.178±0.219 -0.332±0.277 -0.213±0.103 -0.066±0.110
NotEmployed 0.171±0.235 0.410±0.291 0.020±0.103 0.155±0.125
OtherEmployment 0.711±0.194 0.889±0.231 0.379±0.096 0.266±0.092
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Table 14 continued: Estimates of Prosper feature effects by WDR (β/a) and FG (θ)
WDR FG
feature Early payoff Default Early payoff Default
DebtConsolidation 0.147±0.068 -0.838±0.087 0.086±0.027 -0.379±0.034
HomeImprovement 0.208±0.109 -0.783±0.148 0.130±0.044 -0.380±0.060
Business 0.026±0.092 -0.410±0.113 -0.045±0.039 -0.182±0.046
PersonalLoan -0.034±0.096 -0.566±0.123 -0.119±0.042 -0.220±0.047
StudentUse 0.197±0.161 -0.887±0.228 0.112±0.068 -0.480±0.089
Auto 0.359±0.138 -1.215±0.204 0.262±0.057 -0.659±0.086
OtherCategory 0.321±0.085 -1.020±0.117 0.205±0.035 -0.532±0.047
Baby&Adoption -5.469±0.654 0.193±2.178 -6.542±0.709 1.733±0.461
Boat 0.486±1.709 -0.613±2.795 0.608±0.913 0.005±0.988
Cosmetic 0.934±1.442 -2.604±2.855 0.779±0.691 -1.220±1.107
EngagementRing 1.749±1.172 -2.768±2.845 1.455±0.540 -1.676±1.095
GreenLoans -2.227±3.274 0.510±2.045 -1.260±1.248 0.608±1.061
HouseholdExpenses 0.546±0.374 -0.006±0.375 0.023±0.186 -0.063±0.204
LargePurchase 1.059±0.622 -0.447±0.805 0.411±0.348 -0.389±0.378
Medical/Dental -0.056±0.488 0.368±0.479 -0.264±0.233 0.449±0.254
Motorcycle 1.406±0.836 -2.197±1.880 1.084±0.401 -1.512±0.778
RV 1.902±1.274 -3.347±2.655 1.245±0.805 -1.882±1.104
Taxes 0.976±0.520 -0.736±0.745 0.589±0.283 -0.563±0.356
Vacation 0.956±0.670 -0.837±0.939 0.280±0.379 -0.789±0.464
Wedding 0.698±0.826 -0.596±1.158 0.330±0.451 -0.495±0.539
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